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Abstract
We examine how globalization of corporate governance practices inﬂuences the dismissal
risk of European CEOs. It is hypothesized that the harsh monitoring of the American
corporate governance system inﬂuences European CEOs’ dismissal performance sensitivity,
indirectly and directly. The former materializes via European ﬁrms cross-listing on U.S.
exchanges, the latter results from European ﬁrms hiring American independent board mem-
bers. Both inﬂuences are hypothesized to result in increased dismissal performance sensitiv-
ity. Based on data from the 250 largest European publicly traded ﬁrms we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
increase in the dismissal sensitivity in poorly performing companies with American board
membership.
JEL classiﬁcation: G15, G18, G32, M14, M16, M52
Keywords: CEO dismissal, performance sensitivity, globalization, corporate governance,
foreign board membership, binary response models
1Introduction
Fundamental diﬀerences exist between corporate governance systems around the world (e.g.,
Denis & McConnell (2003); La Porta, de Silanes & Shleifer (1999)). However, there is a trend
towards a global harmonization of these systems (e.g. Hansmann & Kraakmann (2001); Perotti
& von Thadden (2003)). The trend is visible both at the institutional level via, for instance, the
proliferation of national corporate governance codes (starting with Cadbury in 1992) and at the
ﬁrm level, via, for instance, the global use of executive stock options (starting in the US in the
1950s). There is currently no consensus about the features of an ultimate global corporate gover-
nance system, should one appear. There are many indications that the industrial world, at least,
has embarked on a route towards a more harmonized corporate government system. Among the
four main corporate governance systems – the Anglo-American system, the German system, the
Latin system and the Japanese system (see e.g. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) and Goergen (1998))
– the Anglo-American system is commonly seen as the most demanding system (Lucier, Schuyt
& Handa (2004). Some will even argue for the ”superiority”, in market performance terms, of
this system (e.g. Economist (2001), p. 32). The strict information requirements imposed by the
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) provide further reasons for regarding the American
system as a good proxy for the most demanding and costly corporate governance system. The
implementation by the United States Congress of the Public Company Accounting reform and
Investor Protection Act 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) further underpins this view. Part of the eﬀort to
achieve a global cost of capital is to comply with the rules of the ”global” corporate governance
system, i.e. the American system.
The globalization of the corporate governance systems may take two major routes: one via
legislation and institutions and another via corporate actions (Coﬀee (2002)). In this study we
focus on the latter route. We analyze non-American (European) companies and the inﬂuence
on dismissal performance sensitivity following from their eﬀorts to reap the beneﬁts of compli-
ance with the American corporate governance system. These beneﬁts accrue as a result of ﬁrm
speciﬁc strategies to achieve a global cost of capital (Stulz (1999)). We analyze the inﬂuence
following from two kinds of eﬀort to do this; to actually comply with the American system (cross-
listing) and to signal compliance by recruiting at least one independent American board member.
2Past research has highlighted how ﬁrms can internationalize their cost of capital by the pro-
cess of cross-listing on the American markets; either directly (on Nasdaq, NYSE, or Amex) or
through an American Depositary Receipt (ADR) (see e.g. Howe & Madura (1990); Sundaram
& Logue (1996); Foerster & Karolyi (1999); Miller (1999); Pagano, R¨ oel & Zechner (2002)).
For example, Siegel (2005) ﬁnds that the beneﬁcial eﬀects that accrued to Mexican ﬁrms cross-
listing at American exchanges were better explained by reputational bonding (to good corporate
governance practices) than by legal bonding, or by forming a strategic alliance with a foreign
multinational ﬁrm (Siegel (2009)). The author shows that Mexican ﬁrms with cross-listing in
the US were not legally forced to protect minority shareholder interest, but acted in accordance
with good corporate governance as they developed a reputational asset in the market for outside
capital.
A second alternative to internationalize the cost of capital with great implications for corpo-
rate governance practices, is the recruiting of an independent representative for the American
corporate governance system. As shown by Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) this may contribute
to institutional contagion of corporate governance practices. They found that this recruitment
produced a harsher performance monitoring of CEOs in Norway and Sweden.
It is commonly argued that globalization of the ﬁrm produces a more complex task environment
for top management (e.g. Finkelstein & Boyd (1998), Sanders & Carpenter (1998)). We argue
in this paper that the compliance with the American corporate governance system means a new
monitoring regime for the complying ﬁrm with increased dismissal performance sensitivity. An
indirect support for this is found in the higher compensation to CEOs of non-American ﬁrms
with Anglo-American listing and/or board inﬂuence (Oxelheim & Randøy (2003)). The higher
compensation reﬂects that the American corporate governance system is less tolerant of poor
performance (Lucier, Schuyt & Handa (2004)). Since the CEOs anticipate that they may be
more heavily penalized for a performance shortfall over their domestic peers, Oxelheim & Randøy
(2005) argue that the higher compensation partly reﬂects a premium for greater risk of dismissal.
The greater CEO dismissal performance sensitivity generates a globalization cost that has been
3neglected in the literature. This cost reﬂects a reduced job security, an increased likelihood of
shorter tenure, and a potentially negative impact on the reputation of the incumbent in case
of dismissal. Countries with a relatively low level of CEO turnover can expect to face higher
levels of CEO dismissal performance sensitivity as their ﬁrms become exposed to monitoring
and regulations from ﬁnancial markets with less turnover tolerance for poor performance (i.e.,
the case of American ﬁnancial markets).
In the empirical part of the paper we study CEO turnover among the 250 largest European pub-
licly traded ﬁrms in 2004. In line with the arguments of Hall & Gingerich (2009) and Pedersen &
Thomsen (1997), we do not expect the eﬀect of ﬁnancial globalization to be uniform. With due
attention to missing observations, we investigate 270 succession events over the period 2000–
2004. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in the dismissal sensitivity in poorly performing companies
with American board membership whereas no signiﬁcant increase is found from cross-listing in
the US.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we review past studies on dismissal
performance sensitivity, and present the research question. We pay special attention to the rele-
vance of agency theory and managerial power. In Section 3 we propose two research hypotheses
to be tested, followed by Section 4 in which we describe the European data and focus on key
binary relationships. In Section 5, we specify the statistical model and test the hypothesized
relationships in a multivariate setting. The results of our model diagnostic and model validation
exercise are reﬂected in Section 6. Finally, we summarize the key ﬁndings and discuss managerial
and policy implications in Section 7.
Dismissal performance sensitivity
The linkage between globalization and CEO pay has been identiﬁed by past studies. Sanders &
Carpenter (1998) report a positive relationship between international sales and CEO compen-
sation in U.S. ﬁrms, and Girma, Thompson & Wright (2002) found a similar result for large UK
ﬁrms. Furthermore, Oxelheim & Randøy (2005) report a positive relationship between CEO
pay and the globalization of sales, globalization of ownership and globalization of board mem-
4bership of Scandinavian ﬁrms. The present study extends past studies to include the eﬀect of
globalization on CEO dismissal risk.
Whereas the direct linkage between performance and dismissal/turnover has been addressed
(e.g. Jensen & Murphy (1990)), the moderating eﬀect of ﬁrm level globalization has not. Specif-
ically, our center of attention is on the dismissal performance sensitivity, and how this sensitivity
of European ﬁrms is moderated by American corporate governance inﬂuence on European ﬁrms.
Agency theory provides a normative approach to the role of executive incentives (including pay
and risk factors) as a corporate governance mechanism. Managerial incentives should bridge
the gap between the interest of managers versus the interest of owners (e.g. Fama (1980);
Fama & Jensen (1983)). The implication is that companies should be paying CEOs with more
incentive-based pay than the supply and demand of executive talent would suggest (e.g. Jensen
& Murphy (1990)). We argue here that agency theory also provides the underlying rationale
for the increased CEO dismissal performance sensitivity related to the globalization of the ﬁrm.
Past research has identiﬁed a speciﬁc pay premium for CEOs being exposed to Anglo-American
board members and foreign regulatory authorities (Oxelheim & Randøy (2005)). We argue that
part of this pay premium is a compensation for the stronger relationship between performance
and dismissal among ﬁrms exposed to such international (American in our case) corporate gov-
ernance monitoring.
The managerial power/managerial entrenchment literature suggests that the governance of cor-
porate behavior may deviate from the normative perspective of agency theory. US-based research
indicates that some CEOs have been able to build a power base that weakens – or even isolates
the CEO – from shareholder demands (Boyd (1994); Zajac & Westphal (1996)). Speciﬁcally,
Allgood & Farrell (2000) found that CEO tenure (a proxy for managerial power) moderates the
relation between ﬁrm performance and turnover. They found that entrenched CEOs are less
exposed to performance–forced dismissals. We argue that globalization of the ﬁrm aﬀects the
potential for CEO entrenchment.
5Hypotheses
The point of departure of this paper is that the American corporate governance system, partic-
ularly during the 1990s and early 2000s, is to be seen as the most demanding and unforgiving
corporate governance system in the world (Lucier, Schuyt & Handa (2004). This view is based
on factors such as a high risk of dismissal, a focus on short-term (quarterly) results, and a high
degree of transparency vis-´ a-vis investors. We argue that the more demanding the corporate
governance system, the less the degree of freedom for the CEO. The form of corporate gov-
ernance in most of the European markets is the so-called insider or control–oriented system
(Bergl¨ of (2000); La Porta, de Silanes & Shleifer (1999). In this corporate governance system the
emphasis is on the ability of large shareholders to monitor corporate behavior (Angblad, Bergl¨ of,
H¨ ogfeldt & Svancar (2001)), whereas the American system puts more emphasis on monitoring
by way of board independence, a market for corporate control, and institutional monitoring (e.g.
SEC and stock exchanges). In line with this, we suggest that CEOs in ﬁrms in non-American
countries that move closer to the American system of corporate governance, will face an in-
creased dismissal performance sensitivity due to institutional contagion.
We emphasize two speciﬁc ﬁrm activities that signal to the international investor community
compliance with an American standard of monitoring corporate behavior. Cross-listing in an
American stock market is one of these activities. Recruitment of at least one independent board
member representing a more demanding corporate governance system, i.e. the American system
is the other. These activities open the way for an institutional spill-over eﬀect that enhances the
CEOs pay while simultaneously increases his/her risk of dismissal. Signals of this kind imply an
upgrading of the corporate governance monitoring compared with that provided solely by the
domestic system.
Cross-listing and dismissal performance sensitivity
International cross-listing is a generally recognized way of breaking away from a domestic capital
market (e.g., Howe & Madura (1990); Sundaram & Logue (1996); Foerster & Karolyi (1999);
Miller (1999); Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz (2004)). Cross-listing implies that the ﬁrm will be scruti-
nized by a new international investor clientele, it will be exposed to new regulatory authorities,
6and it will need to comply with new standards with regards to disclosure and accounting. We ar-
gue that cross-listing in American markets exposes the CEO to higher career risks and rewards.
For most ﬁrms from semi-segmented capital markets, excluding the few companies that already
enjoy an international cost of capital, an American stock exchange listing is a big step, for which
the ﬁrms concerned are rewarded in terms of a higher market value (Mod´ en & Oxelheim (1997),
Stulz (1999)). Part of the value-creation arising from such an American cross-listing is captured
by the CEO (rent-sharing) who possesses the scarce set of skills necessary for a successful cross-
listing (Oxelheim & Randøy (2005)). We argue that the new regulatory environment and the
new investor clientele envisaged at the listing on the US ﬁnancial market will confront the CEOs
with harsher monitoring implying increased dismissal performance sensitivity.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between European ﬁrms’ cross-
listing in the U.S. and their CEO’s dismissal performance sensitivity.
Outsider American board members and dismissal performance sensitivity
Corporate governance research recognizes the essential role of the board of directors in sustaining
an eﬀective organization (OECD (1999); Jensen (1993)). Oxelheim & Randøy (2005) show that
for non-American ﬁrms with one or more independent American board members the CEO of such
a ﬁrm receives a signiﬁcantly higher compensation than a CEO of a ﬁrm without a recruitment of
that kind. One of their explanations of this ﬁnding is the signal these companies send out about
being open for a harsher American styled monitoring. Consequently, CEOs in such a position
will be exposed to a clash between two corporate governance cultures, and the reconciliation
of the two systems will pose new challenges and tasks for them. Among other things this may
call for a new corporate language (Oxelheim, Stonehill, Randøy, Vikkula, Dullum & Mod´ en
(1998)), new internal reporting requirements, new investor-relation activities (Useem (1998))
and a higher dismissal risk. When combined with the lower tolerance for poor performance,
characterizing the American corporate governance system, the dismissal performance sensitivity
will change.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between European ﬁrms’ outsider
American board membership and their CEO’s dismissal performance sensitivity.
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Data sources
We have chosen to study large ﬁrms and CEO successions in these ﬁrms rather than focusing
on all CEO successions. The reason for this is the access to relevant information. The crucial
classiﬁcation of successions into diﬀerent categories heavily relies on the information published
in newspapers and magazines. Only larger ﬁrms are in general covered by the media. Moreover,
our explanatory variable, ”cross-listing on US stock exchanges”, is also dependent on published
information. Since smaller ﬁrms may opt for ADR level-1 or over-the-counter listing, with less
demanding ﬁnancial reporting and disclosure requirement, we argue that the choice of large
ﬁrms is further motivated. The choice of only larger ﬁrms comes at the expense of fewer obser-
vations. This forces us to household with our degrees of freedom by making a thorough analysis
of missing values; a kind of analysis that is called for with the aim of achieving statistical rigor
but which is regrettably omitted in most studies.
Data was collected for the 250 largest (by market capitalization in 2004) European publicly
traded ﬁrms during the time period of 2000-2004. The study is based on the population of
CEO succession events as reported in the ﬁnancial media (e.g. Financial Times). Data on these
events and linked performance data were collected by Booz Allen. Information regarding
independent American board membership (deﬁned as American citizens) and the cross-listing of
European ﬁrms on American markets has either been collected from Annual Reports, company
web pages, or solicited through direct contact with the ﬁrms. The deﬁnition of all variables used
in the study is given in the Appendix A1.
Descriptive univariate statistics
The period of our study covers 270 succession events among the largest 250 European companies.
As found in Table 1, the data set contains CEO succession events from fourteen EU countries.
Only 7% of the succession cases reported involved ﬁrms from non-EU countries like Norway,
Switzerland and the Russian Republic. Approximately 41% of the 270 CEO succession events
occurred in British companies, while 14% of all succession cases happened in companies located
in Germany and 10% in French companies. Observations from those three countries account for
865% of all observations.
Table 1: Country composition of succession events
i Country code absolute frequency relative frequency
1 Belgium BEL 4 0.0148
2 Czech Republic CZE 3 0.0111
3 Denmark DEN 4 0.0148
4 Finland FIN 6 0.0222
5 France FRA 26 0.0963
6 Germany GER 39 0.1444
7 Ireland IRE 5 0.0185
8 Italy ITA 18 0.0667
9 Luxembourg LUX 2 0.0074
10 Netherlands NLD 17 0.0630
11 Portugal POR 0 0.0000
12 Spain SPA 9 0.0333
13 Sweden SWE 8 0.0296
14 United Kingdom UK 110 0.4074
15 Norway NOR 5 0.0185
16 Russian Republic RUS 2 0.0074
17 Switzerland SWI 12 0.0444
P
270 ≈ 1.0000
Table 2: Industry composition of succession events
Industry numerical codes absolute frequency relative frequency
Energy 10 9 0.0333
Materials 15 27 0.1000
Industrials 20 37 0.1370
Consumer discretionary 25 36 0.1333
Consumer staples 30 20 0.0741
Health care 35 11 0.0407
Financial services 40 70 0.2593
Information technology 45 15 0.0556
Telecommunication services 50 21 0.0778
Utilities 55 24 0.0889
P
270 1.0000
9Table 2 demonstrates that our events appear in a broad range of industries. The group ”In-
dustrials” is the biggest group whereas ”Energy” is the smallest in terms of turnover events.
However, in relation to how many ﬁrms there are in each industry in our material the probability
changes substantially.
The circumstances surrounding each turnover case were researched and characterized by one of
11 categories listed in Table 3.
Table 3: Reasons for succession (2000–2004)
r Reason absolute frequency relative frequency (%) classiﬁcation
1 Board/power struggle 26 9.63 forced
2 Move to lesser position 3 1.11 forced
3 Poor performance 72 26.67 forced
4 Death or illness 7 2.59 voluntary
5 Interim CEO 7 2.59 voluntary
6 Job demands 3 1.11 voluntary
7 Merger 66 24.44 merger
8 Planned succession 64 23.70 voluntary
9 Move to another company 16 5.93 voluntary
10 Earlier tenure 0 0.00 voluntary
11 Governance change 6 2.22 voluntary
P
270 100
Each category reﬂects a more or less precise reason for the CEO succession. The descriptive
analysis shows that in about 27% of our cases outside observers interpreted the information
available about the succession case as being indicative of a turnover due to ”poor performance”.
This modal category contains cases in which a CEO is simply ﬁred by the board or forced out of
the position in a more subtle way. Almost twenty four percent of the recorded successions were
characterized as planned successions, events which were known to happen (due to contractual
arrangements or retirement). The third dominant category is constituted by succession events
which happen in the course of a merger. A connection to takeover or merger activity was es-
tablished in more 24% of the recorded events. The events associated with one of these three
categories account for 75% of the total number of cases.
10For the purpose of our CEO succession study we introduce a simple dichotomy based on the
relatively ﬁne grid of reasons exhibited in Table 3. We need to distinguish events in which a
decision unit (integral part of the company, e.g. the board) decides to remove the CEO from
his position due to motives (unplanned developments) related to the company and implements
the decision in one way or another against the preferences of the CEO. Such circumstances are
thought of as a forced succession. If a CEO leaves to take a comparable position in another
company, she/he implements her/his preferences. Such cases are referred to as unforced (by an
internal force) in the sequel. Note that the death of a CEO hardly constitutes voluntary change
in the leadership. But since it is not forced by an exogenous force such events are classiﬁed as
unforced. The distribution over succession events over the coarser scheme of categories is given
in Table 4.
Table 4: Distribution of categories
i Classiﬁcation reasons (r in Table 3) absolute frequency relative frequency (%)
1 Forced 1,2,3 103 38.15
2 Voluntary 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 101 37.41
3 Merger 7 66 24.44
P
270 100.00
After selecting the succession cases which are not related to merger activity, we can rely on a
total of 204 dismissal cases. Each of our succession cases can be classiﬁed as either a dismissal
(forced succession) or a voluntary one. Since M&A’s may be undertaken for disciplining or
management performance reasons, they may sometimes appear to ﬁt the criteria for a forced
succession. However, mergers/takeovers are in the grey area between forced and voluntary dis-
missal. We will control for the robustness of the classiﬁcation in Subsection 5.4
The basic descriptive statistics for all relevant variables are given in Table 5. We list the number
of observations used in the computation of the respective estimate(s) for each variable in the
second column of the table. An n less than 204 indicates the presence of missing values for the
variable at hand.
We have also registered the age of CEOs involved in the succession events. We managed to
collect CEO age from 266 of the 270 succession event - which vary between the ages of 28 and
1175. The youngest CEO, Jonas Birgerson, was aﬃliated with a Swedish information technology
ﬁrm (Framfab). He was removed from his position in the course of a merger (acquisition)
episode in 2000. The two CEO successions which involved 75 year old individuals were both
planned. In the case of the British hardware company Farnell PLC, Morton Mandel served as
an interim CEO for six month, while in the other case Hans-Joachim Langmann retired from
the CEO position, (Vorstandsvorsitzender) at the pharmaceutical company Merck after holding
that position for 30 years.
Table 5: Basic descriptive statistics
Variable n ˆ µ ˆ σ x(1) min. x(n) max.
dismissal 204 .495 .501 .000 1.000
CEO age 194 56.263 7.463 28.000 75.000
CEO tenure 203 6.356 5.703 .100 43.000
market capitalization 202 10091.290 16221.120 1036.160 124282.700
total stock returns 190 -.024 .223 -.676 1.027
US exchange listing 204 .735 .442 .000 1.000
US board membership 185 .184 .388 .000 1.000
US board membership × return 171 -.011 .097 -.676 .293
US listing × return 190 -.025 .181 -.672 1.027
Based on our study we can expect a CEO involved in a succession event to be about 56 years
old (standard deviation of 7.2). 50% of our age observations lie between 52 and 61, i.e. are
distributed over 19% of the range. The skewness measure of -.54 indicates an asymmetrical age
distribution, i.e. the age distribution is skewed to the left and the CEO variable is not normally
distributed. CEO tenure varies between slightly more than a month (interim positions) and
43 years. The latter case is Calisto Tanzi the chairman and founder of the Italian company
Parmalat who was dismissed at the age of 65 due to poor performance in 2003. Based on our
sample we can expect a CEO to be in his (”her” in only one case!) position for 6 years before
he (she) is replaced. The median duration on the job is 1.2 years lower: in 50% of all cases an
individual served more than 4.8 years as CEO before the position was ﬁlled by a successor.
12The missing data problem
Complete data records are available on only 165 of the 204 cases. There are no missing values
for the dependent variable (dismissal). However, the same statement holds only for a subset of
the independent variables. Only the indicator variable US exchange listing and the categorical
variables country grouping and industry category are complete. All other variables have missing
observations for certain cases. There is only one case in which we do not have an observation
on CEO tenure. But the information about the presence of at least one US board member is
not available on 19 (9%) of the records. In the case of the variable US board membership ×
return, which is associated with an interaction term, there are even 33 (16%) of the observations
missing. A diﬀerent perspective of the scope of our missing value problem is provided by Table
6, which shows that 165 (81%) of the records are complete.
Table 6: Distribution of the number of missing values per observed succession case










With close to 20% of our succession cases being incomplete, we will work to clarify whether the
apparent lack of data will have adverse eﬀects when estimating models involving the variables
given in Table 5. Three types of missing data are distinguished. If the dismissal cases for which
we observe missing data form a random subset of the sample under scrutiny then the missing data
are classiﬁed as missing complete at random (mcar). We face the second type of ”missingness” if
the occurrence of the missing data is related to other observables, i.e. dependent or independent
variables. We refer to them as missing at random (mar). Frequently, the absence of data
depends on unknown or unobservable information. The terminology missing not at random
13(mnar) is used to designate this case. In practice, cases with at least one missing value on it are
often simply discarded. To see whether this so-called complete case analysis is admissible from a
statistical point of view we need to establish the type of ”missingness” prevalent in our data. In
the case of mar and mnar, a complete case analysis will imply ineﬃcient and biased estimators
of the model parameters. If one can establish the mcar case, then the estimates obtained using
complete case analysis are still going to be ineﬃcient but unbiased (van der Heijden, Donders,
Stijnen & Moons (2006), Little (1992)). With respect to likelihood based inference, Rubin (1976)
has demonstrated that likelihood ratios are invariant to discarding of incomplete records in the
mcar case. Fortunately, it is possible to test if data are mcar on the basis of the sample. If
this test fails then the imputation of missing data would clearly be preferred to the complete
case analysis.
Testing if missing data are ”missing completely at random”
For the purpose of describing the procedure we have used, let X denote any variable in our data
set. Let C denote the set of indices of all complete records and ¯ C represents the index set of all
records containing at least one missing value. Denote {Xc}, c ∈ C the group of values recorded
for variable X which were found on complete cases and let {Xi}, i ∈ ¯ C denote the set of all
sample values of X which were found on the incomplete records. A test of the simple hypothesis:
H0 : FXc = FXi versus H1 : FXc = FXi, where F denotes a distribution function, is then carried
out. In choosing the statistical test(s), we took the properties of the random variable X under
scrutiny into account. This procedure is carried out for each variable in our study. If we fail to
reject the null hypotheses for most of the variables involved then this is taken as evidence for
the fact that our data are mcar.
In our study, the situation is complicated by the fact that it involves three diﬀerent types of
variables. The observations on CEO age, CEO tenure, market capitalization and total stock
returns (industry adjusted) must be viewed as realizations of continuous random variables while
the remaining variates are of discrete nature: the values on the binary response variable (dis-
missal), as well as the realizations of the variable US exchange listing, and US board membership
can be viewed as realizations of random variables associated by a Bernoulli type distribution.
The remaining categorical variates country group and industry category follow a multinomial
14distribution. To test whether the two samples {Xc} and {Xi} come from the same population
(can be characterized by the same distribution function) each type of random variable requires
another type of test. To boost statistical validity, we chose two admissible non-parametric test
procedures generating evidence against the null by focusing on diﬀerent aspects of the underly-
ing distribution. In the continuous cases, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality
of two distribution functions (Smirnov (1939), Doob (1949), Darling (1957)) along with the rank
based Kruskal-Wallis procedure (Kruskal & Wallis (1952), Fligner (1985)).
Table 7: Properties of continuous variables for complete and incomplete records
Variable fm complete records incomplete records p-values
ˆ µ ˆ σ ˆ µ ˆ σ KS-test KW-test
CEO age 10 56.52 7.21 54.790 8.74 0.515 0.3780
CEO tenure 1 6.64 5.91 5.120 4.57 0.263 0.1003
market capitalization 2 11252.46 17568.19 4913.090 5416.68 0.131 0.1555
total stock returns 14 -.03 .22 -.004 .22 0.914 0.6877
Legend: f
m = absolute frequency for missing; ˆ µ = mean; ˆ σ = standard deviation; KS: Kolmogoroﬀ-
Smirnov test; KW: Kruskal-Wallis test; = exact values (Kim (1969))
As shown in Table 7, the smallest p-value observed for tests of our continuous variables equals
0.1003. The diﬀerences in the ﬁrst two moments shown in the body of the table are not signif-
icant. Based on the p-values, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the data come from the
same population in each and every case. For each variable, the diﬀerent tests imply the same
decision. We therefore conclude that in the case of our continuous variables missing values will
not constitute a problem.
In the case of simple binary data, H0 can be expressed in terms of the equality relative frequencies
for the event that the value 1 is realized. We choose the standard PR-test to test this hypothesis.
According to the summary of results exhibited in Table 8, we ﬁnd no missing values on the
dependent variables (dismissal). There are 83 complete records on which the variable dismissal
takes the value 1, i.e. is indicating that the observed succession case was classiﬁed as a dismissal
(forced). Among the complete cases, a forced succession occurs with a probability being slightly
higher than .5. In comparison, the relative frequency of a dismissal equals 0.4615 given that the
data on the case was incomplete. We clearly fail to reject the hypothesis that the probability
15of the event dismissal is the same in both groups, since the p-value amounts to 0.641. The
same result is obtained for the variables US exchange listing and US board membership. Hence,
missing data on indicator variables will not constitute a problem when a complete case analysis
is executed.
Table 8: Properties of indicator variables for complete and incomplete records
Variable complete records incomplete records p-value
fm f(1) ˆ p(1) f(1) ˆ p(1) PR-test
dismissal 0 83 0.5030 18 0.4615 0.6410
US exchange listing 0 123 0.7455 27 0.6923 0.4987
US board member 19 32 0.1939 2 0.1000 0.3057
Legend: f
m = absolute frequency for missing; f(1) absolute frequency for value 1; ˆ p(1)
relative frequency for value 1; PR-test: proportion test
Finally, the strategy outlined above is applied to the country and industry groupings, i.e. to our
categorical variables country group and industry category. Given the discrete nature of the data,
the use of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov or the Kruskal-Wallis test is not advisable since those tests
require data from an absolutely continuous distribution. As argued in Conover (1980, pp. 368–
376), those tests tend to be conservative when applied to discrete data. Again, the diﬀerences
in the multinomial densities reﬂected as diﬀerences in medians and interquartile ranges do not
appear to be signiﬁcant in the light of the appropriate χ2 test described in Mood, Graybill &
Boes (1974, pp. 448–452). We fail to reject the hypothesis that the realizations in the complete
and incomplete groups come from the same distribution.
16Table 9: Properties of categorical variables for complete and incomplete records
Variable fm complete records incomplete records p-values
median ˆ iqr median ˆ iqr IMD-test
country group 0 1 2 1 3 0.2737
industry indicator 0 2 3 2 2 0.1367
Legend: f
m = absolute frequency for missing; ˆ iqr = inter quartile range; IDM independent
multinomial distribution;
In the light of the evidence exhibited in Tables 6 to 9 we conclude that our data are of the
mcar. Using complete case analysis will not trigger a bias in our estimators.
Model and estimation results
To provide a framework which allows us to test the hypotheses motivated in Section 3, we
chose a binary response type model. In our context, the probability for the event that a CEO
succession is forced as opposed to voluntary is modeled as a non-linear function of risk factors.
After stating the model explicitly, we discuss some aspects concerning statistical inference. Two
alternative speciﬁcations of the model are introduced and the estimation results are presented.
The binary response model
We consider the dichotomous random variable Y taking the value 1 if a succession case is a
dismissal. If the succession is voluntary then the variable assumes the value 0. It is assumed
that the discrete random variable Y follows a Bernoulli distribution depending on the parameter
p ∈ (0,1), the probability of dismissal. Moreover, we assume that there exists a non-linear
functional relationship between the dismissal probability and a set of independent variables
represented by the elements of the vector z, i.e. p = F(θ0z), where F is monotonically increasing
function and θ denotes a parameter vector of appropriate dimension. Under these assumptions
the binary random variable Y follows the Bernoulli distribution
Y ∼ B(F(θ0z)) = F(θ0z)y (1 − F(θ0z))1−y I{0,1}(y)
where I{0,1} denotes the indicator function. Hence
E[Y | Z = z] = p = F(θ0z) (1)
17represents the (non-linear) regression of the random variable Y on the explanatory variables
listed in z.
Estimation approach
To obtain estimates of the parameter vector θ, i.e. ˆ θ, for the binary response model we rely on
the maximum likelihood (ML) procedure. Standard arguments demonstrating the optimality
properties of the ML procedure rely crucially on the assumption of statistical independence of
the observations. In our sample, we have a few succession cases from within the same company.
This fact, most likely, constitutes a violation of this independence assumption. Fortunately, it
has been shown in the literature on adaptive designs that the independence assumption can
be relaxed. Chang (1999), for instance, provide a strong consistency result allowing for certain
dependencies in time. In our situation we should therefore beneﬁt from implementing the ML
approach.
Speciﬁcation of the model
Two speciﬁcations of a the binary response model (1) are discussed below: the logistic speciﬁ-
cation and the probit speciﬁcation. 1 In our case, there is no substantive information available
which would let us choose between the two alternatives a priori. We chose to consider both to
see whether our results are invariant under alternative speciﬁcations.
We employ the speciﬁcations of the binary response model (1) to test the hypotheses concerning
the relationship between the dismissal probability p and US exchange listing (Hypothesis 1), as
well as the relation between p and US board membership (Hypothesis 2). Since one can only
expect to obtain reasonable statistical tests if the coeﬃcients θ are estimated with precision,
1The logistic speciﬁcation follows from choosing the CDF of the standard logistic distribution as a speciﬁcation
for F. Therefore





0z) = [1 + e
−θ0z]
−1
generates the so-called logistic model. Let φ(t) (Φ(•)) denote the density function (CDF) of a standard normal
random variable. Then






is referred to as the probit speciﬁcation of the binary response model.
18we have to avoid the speciﬁcation of a statistical model which might produce unreliable esti-
mates. Based on a theoretical analysis Harrel, Lee, Matchar & Reichert (1985) conclude that
such problems can be avoided if the ratio of the number of outcome events to the number of
explanatory variables (EVP-ratio) lies between 10 and 20. These results were clearly supported
by in an extensive simulation study due to Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper, Holford & Feinstein
(1996). Following their guidelines and taking our data situation into consideration, we should
not include more than ten explanatory variables when modeling the probability of the event
forced succession.
As a result of a structured exploratory modeling phase 2 involving all potential explanatory
variables introduced in Section 3, it became clear that the variables CEO tenure and market
value could be eliminated from the variable pool. Moreover, controlling for all other important
factors the industry categories were never found to be signiﬁcant. Honoring the EVP rule, we
ﬁnally specify our binary response model as




where the independent variables are identiﬁed as z1 = CEO age, z2 = total stock return, z3 = ﬁrst
country-group dummy, z4 = second country-group dummy, z5 = third country-group dummy,
z6 = fourth country-group dummy, z7 = US exchange listing, z8 = US board membership, z9 =
US listing × return, z10 = US board membership × return. The observations on the dichoto-
mous dependent variable are stored in the variable dismissal.
It is possible that industry adjusted stock performance does not have a signiﬁcant main eﬀect on
the probability of dismissal, but the eﬀect of the total stock return varies with some character-
istics of the succession case or the nature of the environment in which the case is embedded. To
account for such interaction eﬀects we introduce the two interaction terms US exchange listing
× return and US board membership × return into the model (a term over and above the ﬁrst
order term). These interaction terms constitute the variables z9 and z10. The resulting logit
and probit version of model (2) is estimated using the maximum likelihood approach.
2The authors have carefully documented the speciﬁcs of the procedures run and the results obtained. The
material can be obtained from the authors upon request.
19Estimation Results
Prior to performing the ML estimation procedure we assessed whether the suﬃcient condition
for the existence, ﬁniteness and uniqueness of estimates as given by Albert & Anderson (1984,
Theorem 3,p.7) is fulﬁlled. A numerical check conﬁrmed that our data exhibits the pattern
referred to as overlap, implying that the said suﬃcient condition holds. As could be expected
in such a case, we observed a rapid convergence of the algorithm locating the maximum of the
likelihood function under both speciﬁcations.
Table 10: Summary table for logit and probit models
Logit Probit
Variables Estimate p-value S-Ind. Estimate p-value S-Ind.
Const. 11.22 0.000 *** 6.56 0.000 ***
CEO age -0.19 0.000 *** -0.11 0.000 ***
total stock return -0.85 0.610 -0.57 0.581
country-group dummy 1 -0.96 0.037 ** -0.60 0.030 **
country-group dummy 2 -2.11 0.013 ** -1.27 0.007 **
country-group dummy 3 0.63 0.387 0.36 0.391
country-group dummy 4 -1.41 0.060 * -0.86 0.058 *
US exchange listing 0.61 0.187 0.36 0.187
US board membership -0.74 0.224 -0.41 0.232
US listing × return 0.49 0.805 0.33 0.789
US board membership × return -11.94 0.021 ** -7.11 0.020 **
sample size 165 165
Log-lik. -83.68 -83.59
pseudo R2 0.27 0.27
Legend: S-ind. ≡ signiﬁcance indicator: * if p < 0.10, ** if p < 0.05, *** if p < 0.001
Our ML estimation results are summarized in Table 10. At a ﬁrst glance both models are
valid and from a qualitative point of view the models produce identical results. There are no
diﬀerences in the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients. With respect to the statistical signiﬁcance
of the ML estimates, the ﬁndings are identical for the two speciﬁcations. In both cases we do not
20ﬁnd main eﬀects for the variables US exchange listing and US board membership but a clearly
signiﬁcant interaction term US membership × return indicating a moderator eﬀect of US board
membership on the relationship between the dismissal risk and the performance variable total
stock return. 3
Model diagnostics and validation
Prior to discussing the substantive conclusions which can be drawn from our statistical results,
we turn to model diagnosis and model validation. The diagnostics for the logit model and the
probit model yield similar results. To avoid redundancy, only the results for the logistic model
are reported. The same holds for the outcome of our approach to internal model validation.
Assessing goodness-of-ﬁt
The logistic model reported above was found to be signiﬁcant. To assess the ﬁt of the model,
we draw on various standard statistical tests. Being aware of the uncertainties surrounding the
operational characteristics of these tests in our speciﬁc situation, we augment the analysis by
employing a graphical method, so called marginal model plots. Both approaches fail to produce
evidence against the model. As a result we attest convincing explanatory power to the binary
response models at hand.
The standard likelihood-ratio-test of the hypothesis
H0 : θ1 = θ2 = ... = θi = ... = θ10 = 0
H1 : θi 6= 0 for at least one i
3Following up on our discussion of alternative classiﬁcation schemes for CEO dismissals in Section 4.2, we
reclassiﬁed the CEO succession cases occurring in the context of mergers as dismissals and estimated the model
using the same set of independent variables. Compared to the original classiﬁcation the Pseudo R
2 decreases
by 0.0534. We observe no sign changes and very similar numerical values. Given the new dependent variable,
the coeﬃcients for the country dummy (cg1) and the interaction term ”US board membership x return” are no
longer signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. Moreover, our dummy for the introduction of the ”Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002” did not turn out to be signiﬁcant on the ﬁve percent level. This holds for both classiﬁcation schemes
considered.
21results in a realization of the test statistic χ2(10) = 61.36 (p =0.0000). We clearly reject H0.
At least one of the explanatory variables contributes signiﬁcantly to the model. In addition, the
value of McFadden’s pseudo R2 (likelihood-ratio index) of 0.27 indicates that the inclusion of
our predictors have the desired signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood function.
Having identiﬁed a reasonable model, say Mθ(y | z) for the true but unknown conditional distri-
bution of binary succession events y represented as F(y | z), we can now turn to more reﬁned
aspects of the model. To assess its goodness of ﬁt, we set out to test the hypothesis H0 : F = Mθ
versus H1 : F 6= Mθ. Several omnibus tests of this hypothesis are used in practice. The opera-
tional characteristics of those tests are known if all explanatory variables are either (i) discrete
(with repeated measurements) or (ii) continuous. Our model relies on a mixture of discrete and
continuous independent variables. If statistical validity matters, a naive implementation of those
standard tests appears to be unwarranted. Apart from reporting the outcome of a standard test
of ﬁt, we assess the ﬁt of the model by a non-parametric technique.
Hosmer & Lemeshow (1980) devised a test procedure for the case of continuous explanatory
variables. The test pools observations according to the model probabilities. Carrying out this
test, we obtain a test statistic of χ2(154) = 152.88 (p = 0.5103). At standard signiﬁcance levels,
we clearly fail to reject the null. The model seems to ﬁt reasonably well. 4
An alternative method for assessing the ﬁt of a binary response model is due to Cook & Weisberg
(1991). They introduce their marginal model plots (MMPs) as a non-parametric device to
generate evidence against the hypothesis H0 : F = Mθ. The rationale underlying the procedure
(details are given in Appendix A2) does not depend on the nature of the regressors. Estimates
of two mean functions – one model-free and the other depending on the hypothesized model M
– are contrasted. Severe diﬀerences between the functions are interpreted as evidence against
H0. elected plots exhibited in Figure 1 are representative for the pattern found in all cases.
4This test has known drawbacks. The procedure is insensitive to variation within the groups which causes the
test to perform poorly in simulation experiments (le Cessie & van Houwelingen (1991)). We could overcome this
apparent drawback by using a kernel based method as proposed by Conover (1980) or le Cessie & van Houwelingen
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Figure 1: MMP for the mean with EF = red and E ˆ M = blue
Note that the observations on our dependent variable, the incidents of voluntary successions
(y = 0) and forced events (y = 1) have been jittered to allow for a visualization of the den-
sity aspect. The MMP’s in subﬁgures (a) and (b) involve explanatory variables in the model.
In subﬁgure (c), h(z) was chosen to be a variable not included in the model. While the last
subﬁgure contains an MMP with ﬁtted values. Apart from areas characterized by sparse data,
we do not detect grave and/or systematic deviations between the estimated mean functions.
Numerous experiments with random directions did not reveal cases which could have been used
as convincing evidence against the null hypothesis. To summarize: under each of the two very
diﬀerent statistical concepts aimed at detecting a lack-of-ﬁt, we fail to ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence
against our model M, i.e. we do not ﬁnd conclusive evidence against the logistic model.
23Assessing predictive power
To further evaluate the model we addressed it’s predictive power - as a classiﬁer of succession
events based on a set of explanatory variables. To provide such a characterization, let ˆ pi =
F(ˆ θ0zi) denote the model based estimate for the probability of the event the i’th succession case
is a dismissal and deﬁne the classiﬁcation rule
Ri(c) =
(
ˆ pi ≥ c ⇒ case i is a dismissal case
ˆ pi < c ⇒ case i is a voluntary case
Implementing the classiﬁcation rule R(c = 0.5) we classify each case for which ˆ pi exceeds 0.5 as
a forced succession. The outcome of this can then be contrasted with the observed nature of the
case. Each of the 165 probability estimates is processed in this way. The results are summarized
in Table 11.
Table 11: Summary statistics for model based classiﬁcation
classiﬁed true
P
by R(0.5) forced voluntary
forced 61 19 80
voluntary 22 63 85
P
83 82 165
In our sample, we observed 83 dismissal cases, while 82 of the 165 cases were events in which
the succession was voluntary. Using the R(0.5) rule for classiﬁcation on the basis of the proba-
bility estimates, a total of 80 cases are classiﬁed as forced succession, while in 85 instances we
predict that the case is a voluntary succession. On the basis of the information provided by the
2 × 2 contingency table the probability of the event a case is correctly classiﬁed on the basis of
the model is readily estimated as 0.75. Several conditional probabilities related to success and
failures of the model-based classiﬁer are of interest.
The probability that a case is classiﬁed as forced turnover on the basis of our model, given that
it was observed in reality, equals 0.73. For a succession case which has been observed to be of the
24voluntary type the chance of classifying it as voluntary using the model based classiﬁer R(0.5)
amounts to 77%. Suppose it is known that the model based classiﬁer indicates a dismissal then
the probability for the event a forced dismissal was observed equals 0.76. The odds of observing
voluntary succession given our model suggests a voluntary case is slightly lower, 0.74.
Given that voluntary is the true nature of a succession, we will classify such a case as forced
using our model in 23.17% of all cases. Another type of error is committed if a succession is
indeed forced and the classiﬁer assigns the value ”voluntary”. The respective conditional error
probability amounts to 0.27. Given the model suggests a forced succession, then in 23.75% of
all cases our model will incorrectly suggest that the opposite holds. Finally, given our classiﬁer
suggests a voluntary succession, the odds for the event the true nature of the succession is a
dismissal amounts to 25.88%.
The in-sample predictive performance as it unfolds once we would start to vary the critical level c
in our classiﬁer between 0 and 1, was calculated and the respective ROC curve was constructed.
5 It suﬃces to say that the area under the ROC curve is approximately equal to 0.83. We
conclude that our logistic model, apart from ﬁtting the data well, performs surprisingly well as
a classiﬁer (in-sample).
Assessing stability of parameter estimates
Our choice of the maximum likelihood (ML) approach to estimation is motivated by its known
statistical optimality properties. On the other hand, ML estimators are known to be sensitive to
data points which are extreme in the response space and/or in the space of explanatory variables
Z. Since our data was not generated in the course of a controlled experiment, we have to guard
against the possibility that the realization of our estimator ˆ θ – therefore also our interpretation
given below – depends on a single or several extreme observations. In addition, we screen our
data for observations exerting strong inﬂuence on the goodness of ﬁt measures which were dis-
cussed above.
Among the available methods suitable for detecting inﬂuential observations in binary response
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Figure 2: Inﬂuence measures for N = 165 observations
models we relied on the leverage measure and the ∆i(β) statistic both devised by Pregibon
(1981). Based on earlier work in linear regression Andrews & Pregibon (1978), Pregibon intro-
duced the hii statistic (leverage) in the context of binary response models. The statistic reﬂects
whether an observation is poorly ﬁt by the model and/or whether the observation constitutes
an extreme point in the explanatory variables space (exerting inﬂuence on ˆ θ). Observations as-
sociated with a leverage value close to 1 deserve special attention. The hight of i’th the spike in
Figure 2 (a) indicates the value of the leverage statistic for observation i, for i = 1,2,...,N. The
highest leverage value equals .352, observed for case ]125. According to the leverage criterion,
none of the 165 succession cases appears to be problematic. Pregibon’s ∆i(β) measure reﬂects
the eﬀect on the (conﬁdence contours of the) estimator due to deleting the i’th succession case
from the sample. Inspecting the height of the spikes in subﬁgure Figure 2 (b) suggests that the
∆12(β) and ∆125(β) deserve our special attention.
To get an idea about the actual eﬀect a deletion of observations will have on the elements of
estimator, observations ]12 and ]125 were actually deleted from the data set one at a time and
then simultaneously. In each case, the model was estimate. Table 12 allows the assessment of
the eﬀects. For each deletion we give the estimates of the statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
together with their p-values. We included the respective estimates based on the complete data
set in columns two and three. In addition the likelihood ratio statistic as well as the value of
26the likelihood are given in each case.
Table 12: Summary of estimates after deletion of observations
statistic full N = 165 drop ]12 drop ]125 drop ]12,125
country-group -.965 0.037 -.992 0.032 -.970 0.037 -1.001 0.031
dummy 1
country-group -2.111 0.013 -2.817 0.011 -2.196 0.010 -2.921 0.009
dummy 2
country-group -1.409 0.060 -1.442 0.055 -1.383 0.065 -1.415 0.060
dummy 4
US board mem- -11.943 0.021 -12.498 0.019 -11.524 0.031 -12.106 0.028
bership × return
LR χ
2(10) 61.36 63.71 61.95 64.43
Likelihood -83.68 -81.821 -82.691 -80.76
Deletions did neither aﬀect signs of the estimates nor their statistical signiﬁcance. We did not
observe qualitative changes. Once we delete case ]12 alone or in combination with observa-
tion ]125, we observe that the deletions increased the absolute values of estimates and never
increased the p-values. This statement also holds for the coeﬃcients of country-group dummy 1
and country-group dummy 2 if we eliminate observation ]125 alone. A slight decrease occurs in
the absolute value of the coeﬃcient of country-group dummy 4 and its p-values increase slightly.
The interaction eﬀect becomes stronger but the respective p-value increases slightly. Note also
the tendency of the likelihood ratio statistic to increase as a consequences of the deletions. The
same holds for the likelihood function evaluated at ˆ θ.
The observations ]12 (dismissal event) and ]125 (voluntary succession) are cases sharing one
common characteristic: their scores on the performance variable total share return lie in the
ﬁrst quintile: industry adjusted extremely poor performance preceded the succession event. So
far, there is no reason to believe that the two succession cases under scrutiny are in any sense
invalid. Should it, in retrospect turn out that those data points would have to be deleted, then
we can be sure that apart from small (even desirable) quantitative changes in strength of eﬀects
and their signiﬁcance, our interpretation of the estimation results given in the sequel will be
robust to the perturbation of the data set.
27Errors in variables
The maximum likelihood procedure will provide minimum variance estimator if (1) the binary
response model is appropriate, (2) the explanatory variables have been measured without error,
and (3) no measurement error occurs in the binary response variable. In our case (3) implies
that no errors occur when succession cases are associated with one of the categories either forced
or voluntary turnover. Note that we have established (1) in Section 6.1. What can then be
said about the potential for measurement error in the explanatory variables (risk factors)? The
measurements on CEO age are hardly subject to error. Given the prominence of the ﬁrms,
the CEO’s are often public ﬁgures whose CV’s are publicly available. The realizations on our
performance measure total stock returns are based on publicly available data taken from reports
which are subject to legal requirements. Although we do not know the exact procedure accord-
ing to which the data was produced, it is hard to imagine that error sources apart from rounding
errors etc. aﬀect the measure. Although small disturbances are likely, gross measurement error
is unlikely. Our country grouping variables should be free of error, since the classiﬁcation rule
known to us is operating on error free primary data. With large diversiﬁed companies the as-
sociation with a single industry may be problematic in some cases, most of the classiﬁcations
can hardly be questioned. The process of generating the variable US exchange listing and US
board membership data generation had been double checked by the authors on an individual
basis. When the information existed there was no reason to believe that it was faulty. As a
consequence the probability of measurement errors is low for the bulk of our dismissal risk factors.
As mentioned in Section 4 our dichotomy implying the realizations on our dependent variable
(dismissal) is based on eleven categories each reﬂecting a more or less precise reason for the
observed succession. Neither the details of the research process nor the classiﬁcation rules ap-
plied by the agency generating the data on our variable reason category are transparent. It is
unclear whether one single analyst classiﬁed cases or whether a group of researchers worked on
each case independently before a classiﬁcation decision was taken. We also cannot exclude the
possibility that the sources used by the researchers presented succession cases in diﬀerent ways.
The potential for erroneous misclassiﬁcation is higher in the case of the dependent variable than
among the factors thought to inﬂuence the dismissal risk.
28The theoretical work by Michalek & Tripathi (1980) who consider a mix of categorical and
continuous explanatory variables which resembles the situation in our data set, implies that in
the presence of moderate errors-in-variables the statistical properties of ˆ θ will be asymptoti-
cally stable. Focusing on errors-in covariates Carroll, Spiegelman, Lan, Bailey & Abbott (1984)
point out that correction for measurement error is advantageous only, if the variance of the
measurement error (and the sample size) is such that the bias in the standard ML estimator ˆ θ
is large relative to the increase in the variance which is typically produced by techniques aiming
at bias correction. Their analysis also suggests that such conditions materialize in the presence
of very large data sets. On the other hand, Cheng & Hsueh (1999) discuss promising methods
of bias reduction when measurement error is only a problem of the dependent variable. Their
techniques require a validation subsample. In addition, the procedures depend on information
about the misclassiﬁcation probabilities.
Given our earlier assessment of the likelihood of measurement error in the explanatory variables,
we only have to be concerned with misclassiﬁcation in the dependent variable. On the other
hand, the techniques known for bias correction depend on information concerning the misclassiﬁ-
cation probabilities. We do not have this information. If we would apply the methods suggested
by Cheng & Hsueh (1999), we would have to rely on strong, largely unfounded, assumptions. On
the other hand, the asymptotic nature of the Michalek & Tripathi (1980) result has to be taken
into consideration. In the interest of producing statistically valid results we need to explore
whether our estimator is stable given our relatively small sample size and the possibility for
misclassiﬁcation of succession cases. We can do this by measuring our binary response’s range
of inﬂuence in our model of dismissal risk.
The procedure run can be described as follows: Let ˆ θ(y) denote the ML estimate obtained on
the basis of the original data set. Next, suppose we change the classiﬁcation of i’th succession
case. If the dependent variable has the value 1 (0), then the value 0 (1) is assigned to it. Af-
ter making this marginal change to the data set we produce a new ML estimate ˆ θ(y(∗i)). To
quantify the eﬀect of the change in classiﬁcation, we compute di = d( ˆ θ(y), ˆ θ(y(∗i) ), where d
denotes some measure of distance. The eﬀect of a single misclassiﬁcation of the i’th succession
29case on the estimate is simulated in this way given that that all other responses are ﬁxed. Since
we are not only interested in the parameter estimates themselves but typically in functions of
the parameter vector like standard deviations or t-values or conﬁdence limits, we generalize the
statistic to d
f
i = d(f(ˆ θ(y)), f(ˆ θ(y(∗i) )) where f : IRn → IRm, with n ≥ m.
Our implementation of this procedure focused on (i) changes in the parameter estimates and
on changes in (ii) the signiﬁcance level. Under both aspects, it is not possible to identify
cases which would change our results drastically. Both, our parameter estimates as well as our
interpretation and conclusion given below will in all likelihood not be aﬀected in a substantial
way by a misclassiﬁcation of singular succession cases.
Internal validation
A complete discussion of validity issues covers the aspects of internal as well as external validity.
To study external validity of our model, we need a sample from a population which diﬀers along
various dimensions from the one considered when estimating our logistic model. For the purpose
of internal validation, we study the performance of the model in a sample of succession cases
drawn from a population similar to the one which was used to estimate the original logistic
model. Since we do not intend to use the model for prediction (classiﬁcation), we will focus on
the parameter estimates of interest, i.e. the main eﬀects and the coeﬃcient of the signiﬁcant
interaction term US board membership × return.
Several approaches to internal validation are considered. Since bootstrapping as an internal val-
idation technique is recommended in the literature, we choose this technique in our validation
eﬀort. By means of a large scale simulation study Steyerberg, Harrell, J.J.M., Borsboom, Ei-
jkemans, Vergouwe & Habbema (2001) have demonstrated that, in the context of the logistic
model, the bootstrap validation strategy provided stable estimates with a small bias and clearly
outperformed other approaches. The bootstrap mimics the process of drawing a sample from an
underlying population by sampling with replacement from the sample available. The samples
drawn are of the same size as the original data set. The rationale underlying this strategy, as
well as its feasibility has been outlined, for instance, in Efron & Gong (1983) and Gleason (1988).
30We drew 100 samples with replacement, each of size N = 165, from our original sample. Af-
ter each draw the logistic model was estimated and the parameter estimates, apart from other
statistics, were stored. In a ﬁrst step, we produced non-parametric density estimators for each
parameter estimate. A subset of those densities are displayed in Figure 3. In all cases the densi-
ties are fairly symmetric. The thin left tails are due to strange outcomes of very few replications.
The mode of the bootstrapped densities lie close to the maximum likelihood estimators deter-
mined in Section 5.4. The evidence on the normal distribution of the estimates is mixed. While
the distribution of estimates for the coeﬃcients of some variables (CEO age, total stock returns,
country-group dummy 1, US exchange listing) seems to be close to a normal distribution, this
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Figure 3: Non-parametric density estimators (100 replications)
31Since it is diﬃcult to relate the information concerning the spread to the point estimators (c.f.
Section 5.4), we compare the ML based interval estimators to the bootstrap interval estimators.
The estimators are listed in Table 13 along with some supplementary information. In each
case, we give the length of the interval in the column headed ∆. With the exception of the
ﬁrst country-group dummy, the bootstrap intervals are wider than their ML counterparts. The
length of the intersection between the two conﬁdence intervals expressed as a fraction of the ML
conﬁdence interval is given in the coverage column. A coverage of 1 indicates that the ML based
interval is a true subset of the bootstrap interval. An inspection of Table 13 shows that there
are four such cases. While a value of 0.8094 implies that approximately 81% of the ML interval
contains points which are elements of both the ML interval and the bootstrap interval, as is the
case for the coeﬃcient of the variable CEO age. In instances where the coverage is smaller than
1, the bootstrap intervals tend to be shifted over to the left relative to the ML intervals. This
fact is due to a few special simulation outcomes.
Table 13: 95% conﬁdence intervals for ML and the bootstrap
logit bootstrap Qual.
Variables llow lup ∆L llow lup ∆B coverage diﬀ.
CEO age -.2691 -.1157 0.0934 -.3206 -.1335 0.1871 0.8094 no
total stock return -4.1224 2.4192 6.5416 -6.9583 1.1747 8.1330 0.8097 no
country-group dummy 1 -1.8716 -.0580 1.8136 -1.8813 -.1278 1.7535 0.9606 no
country-group dummy 2 -3.7756 -.4463 3.3293 -7.5012 -.8542 6.6470 0.8748 no
country-group dummy 3 -.7961 2.0553 2.8514 -1.1322 2.9038 4.0360 1.0000 no
country-group dummy 4 -2.8754 .0581 2.9335 -3.4995 -.1807 3.3188 0.9185 yes
US exchange listing -.2976 1.5247 1.8223 -.3916 1.6868 2.0784 1.0000 no
US board membership -1.9206 .4491 2.3694 -2.5411 .4618 3.0029 1.0000 no
US listing × return -3.4299 4.4164 7.8463 -3.3633 8.3146 11.6779 1.0000 no
US board membership -22.0950 -1.7910 20.304 -26.4969 -5.7453 20.7516 0.8052 no
× return
The items in column nine of Table 13 indicate whether the decisions in tests of signiﬁcance of
partial coeﬃcients based on the ML conﬁdence interval and the bootstrap interval would diﬀer,
i.e. whether a qualitative diﬀerence would prevail. Such a qualitative diﬀerence is found in only
one case. The coeﬃcient of the fourth country dummy becomes clearly signiﬁcant in the light
of the bootstrap evidence.
32Using the bootstrap strategy in our validation eﬀort allows us to conclude that our ML es-
timation results are likely to understate the uncertainty associated with the ML estimator ˆ θ.
Estimates based on samples from populations similar to our population will exhibit somewhat
more variability than suggested by the asymptotic properties of the ML estimator. On the other
hand our bootstrapping results also show that it is extremely unlikely that we ever would have
to change our model, since ﬁrst of all, neither the risk factor US exchange listing nor the factor
US board membership have main eﬀects, and secondly that a signiﬁcant moderating eﬀect is at-
tributed to the variable US independent board membership. It clearly moderates the relationship
between the ﬁrm performance and dismissal probability.
Finally, our validation exercise seems to be valuable when viewed from a diﬀerent perspective.
Our initial data set is constituted by all succession events occurring over a given period in the
universe of the 250 largest European companies. If one works with such a data set, it would
hardly be adequate to state that we are working with a sample, not to mention a random sample.
Our use of term random sample throughout the statistics section can be justiﬁed by the fact that
20% of our observations were excluded due to missing observations. We spend considerable eﬀort
in Section 4.3 to show that the nature of the process which caused the missing observations is
unsystematic. So it is, in a sense, a random mechanism which determined the 165 observations
eventually ending up in our data set. Or to put it the other way around: each of the 165
succession cases had the same chance to end up in our random sample.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper addresses the globalization of corporate governance practices and focuses on CEO
dismissal risk. The issue of CEO dismissal (and CEO incentives) is of great concern to public
policy-makers, to investors and to regulators. This is reﬂected in a number of corporate gover-
nance reports from the OECD, FIBV, and central banks on the one hand, and in the corporate
governance guidelines from sources such as the Cadbury Commission, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, on the other. The focus here is on the inﬂuence of American ﬁnancial markets on
dismissal performance sensitivity in European ﬁrms. We argue that globalization of boards and
33foreign exchange listings are important ﬁnancial facilitators for transfer of ideas and practices
across various corporate governance regimes.
The applied research design provides a natural experiment on the issue of CEO dismissal and
ﬁnancial globalization. Whereas most corporate governance research is of a cross-sectional na-
ture, this paper allows for a test that clearly reduces endogeneity problems. Taking a critical
position with respect to our own modeling approach, we carried out extensive model diagnostics
and implemented model validation routines. The procedures produced no evidence against the
statistical model chosen.
We have found our results robust to the classiﬁcation of the dismissal implications of mergers
and acquisitions which are in general diﬃcult to categorize (cf. footnote 3 on page 24). More-
over, we have found no impact on the dismissal relation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act implemented
during the period of investigation. Performance alone has been found to have no eﬀect on the
dismissal risk which is in line with a range of compensation studies that ﬁnd a small and some-
times insigniﬁcant underlying pay-performance relationship (Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomez-Mejia
(2000)). Finally, our country dummies indicate that the UK and Irish ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less
likely to force CEO dismissal than ﬁrms from the Rhine-region countries. Considering that the
UK has a corporate governance system and shareholder protection environments comparable to
the US (La Porta, de Silanes & Shleifer (1999)) this result triggers further research.
In line with our theory based prediction, the tests in this study show that globalization in
the market for corporate control increases dismissal performance sensitivity. This indicates in-
stitutional contagion driven by American board membership on European corporate boards.
We argue that the result is particularly interesting, since non-American ﬁrms are becoming
increasingly concerned about the costs of American stock regulations in general and of the im-
plementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in particular (Bartram, Stadtmann & Wissmann
(2006), Economist (2006). Contrary to our predictions, the empirical results show no signiﬁcant
increase in dismissal performance sensitivity from American cross-listing. This eﬀect might be
due to the fact that foreign stock listing only indirectly aﬀects boards’ decision-making. The in-
signiﬁcance of the cross-listing variable may also reﬂect the inconclusiveness of previous research
34on European ﬁrms reﬂecting the relatively ”weak” commitment in undertaking a cross-border
listing as compared to the more demanding corporate action of undertaking a cross-listing and




CEO age The CEO’s age (years) at the time of the dismissal
CEO tenure The CEO’s tenure (years) as CEO with the company
Market capitalization Stock market value in millions of Euros at the time of
the dismissal
Total stock returns The total stock return to investors (including dividends)
relative to ﬁrm’s industry one year leading up to the
dismissal event
US exchange listing The company has a US-based stock exchange listing at
the time of the dismissal: value of 1 if such listing exists
- 0 otherwise.
US board membership The company has at least one independent (non-employee)
board member with a US citizenship: value of 1 if such
board member(s) exist(s) - 0 otherwise.
US listing × return Interaction term between Total stock returns and US
exchange listing
US board membership × return Interaction term between Total stock returns and US
exchange listing
Country groups All European countries were divided into ﬁve groups:
(1) Anglo-Saxon := Ireland, United Kingdom
(2) Benelux := Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands
(3) Mediterranean := Italy, Portugal, Spain
(4) Nordic := Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
(5) Rhine := France, Germany, Switzerland Rhine,
where (5) serves as baseline in the dummy coding scheme.
Industry category 2-digit industry classiﬁcation
36A2: Marginal model plots: Concept and procedure
The conditional expectation under the true F is written as EF(y | h(z)) where h(z) is a mea-
surable function taking IRp into IR1 while E ˆ M(y | h(z)) denotes the conditional expectation
based on Mˆ θ. The estimates of the two mean functions are generated using non-parametric
smoothing. A smooth of EF(y | h(z)) versus the values of h(z) giving ˆ EF(y | h(z)) and the
smooth of E ˆ M(y | h(z)) versus h(z) provides the estimated mean function based on the model
ˆ E ˆ M(y | h(z)). Using the same smoothing technique allows for a point-wise comparison of the
estimated means functions. To generate an MMP plot one superimposes the estimates of the two
mean functions on a plot of the binary dependent variable y against levels of h(z). If the model
M is a reasonable approximation to the true distribution F then for any measurable function of
the explanatory variables z the estimates of the two mean function will be approximately equal
EF(y | h(z)) ≈ ˆ E ˆ M(y | h(z)).
Approximate equality provides support for M. On the other hand, if one ﬁnds stark diﬀerences
for some choice of h(z) then this is interpreted as evidence against the speciﬁcation M. The
theoretical basis for the MMP plots consists in the following result due to Cook (1998)
Resultat 1 Let h(z) : IRp → IR1 be a measurable function of z. Then
EF(y | z) = E ˆ M(y | z), ∀z ∈ Z ⊂ IRp ⇔ EF(y | h(z)) = E ˆ M(y | h(z)), ∀h
An in depth technical discussion of the conditions under which a graphical comparison of two
non-parametric curves is feasible and meaningful is found in Bowman & Young (1996). An
excellent discussion of MMP plots from a Bayesian perspective has been provided by Pardoe
& Cook (2002). The latter reference also includes interesting innovations with respect to the
MMP plot.
Some of the possible choices for h(z) include individual explanatory variables which are in the
model, ﬁtted values, predictors outside the model and so-called random directions (which are
linear combinations of predictors for which the weights are chosen at random). We prepared
MMP plots for a variety of functions of the explanatory variables. The selected plots exhibited
in Figure 1 are representative for the pattern found in all cases.
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